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CoMnvrs
BAIL AND BAIL BONDSMEN: NEED FOR REFORM
IN KENTUCKY
If it is true that "the quality of a nation's civilization can be
largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of
its criminal law," then the American bail system as it now operates
can no longer be tolerated. At best, it is a system of checkbook
justice; at worst, a highly commercialized racket.1
INTRODUCION
The system of bail in Kentucky, as in most states throughout this
country, has long been restricted to the financial bond as the method
of securing the presence of the accused at various stages of the
criminal process. As a general rule, a professional surety or bondsman
posts bond for the accused in return for which he exacts a fee in the
form of a premium.
Two basic postulates of the American criminal process are that the
financial condition of the defendant shall not be a determining factor
vis--vis the defendant's relationship to the criminal process, and that
loss of one's freedom shall be minimal. The most obvious result of
this checkbook system of pretrial justice is the creation of a lucrative
private business which adversely effects both of these postulates.
This effect has been forcefully and succinctly summarized by Justice
Skelly Wright:
The effect of such a system is that the professional bondsmen hold
the keys to the jail in their pockets. They determine for whom they
will act as surety-who in their judgment is a good risk. The bad
risks, in the bondsmen's judgment, and the ones who are unable
to pay the bondsmen's fees, remain in jail. The court and the
commissioner are relegated to the relatively unimportant chore of
fixing the amount of bail 2
The primary goal of any bail reform is to increase the number of
defendants who need not be incarcerated prior to trial. A second
objective is to minimize or completely eliminate the middleman, the
professional bail bondsman, and have the accused deal directly with
the court. The purpose of this comment is to critically examine the
practices of the professional surety as a purposeful entity under the
traditional system of bail and pretrial release, and to suggest alter-
native procedures for implementing reform of Kentucky's archaic
bail laws. These alternatives will likely eliminate the professional




bail bondsmen from the criminal process and restore the administration
and control of bail to the courts. At a minimum, these alternatives
will provide routes to pretrial release which will serve to diminish
the need for the surety in the criminal system.
I. EMERGENCE OF THE PROFEssIoNAL SuRETY-HsToRICAL PERSPECtiVE
The development of the right to bail probably antedates recorded
English law and was explicitly recognized by the early English
commentators.8 In medieval England, the accused was brought
before the local justice of the peace or sheriff for an initial examina-
tion of the charges. If there was a basis for the charges, the accused
had to be committed, or, in lieu of imprisonment, had to give bail
by obtaining securities for his appearance at trial.4 Originally, the
surety assumed personal responsibility 5 for the accused. His failure
to produce the defendant at trial meant forfeiture of his own
property.6
Three factors coalesced in England to encourage the use of
release on bail. First, freedom on bail after arrest was of prime
importance because preliminary investigation might be delayed for
long periods of time.7 Second, confinement was an expensive and
vexatious duty which the medieval sheriff viewed pessimistically.
Thus, he was easily persuaded to abdicate this burdensome duty by
releasing the accused into the hands of a responsible surety.8 The
third causal factor which led to the development of a system of
pretrial release as an alternative to imprisonment was the deplorable
condition of the medieval jails.9
In 1275, bailable offenses were codified into the English legal
framework by the Statute of Westminster,'0 and the prohibition
against excessive bail was enunciated in the Bill of Rights." In
3 1 J. STEPEN, A HIsTroY OF THE CRmNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 233 (1833).
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIS 0296.
5 Blackstone describes bail as: "a delivery or bailment of a person to his
sureties, upon their giving (together with himself) sufficient security for his
appearance; he being supposed to continue in their friendly custody, instead of
going to gaol." Id. at *297 (emphasis added).
6 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 590 & n.2
(2d ed. 1903). As a matter of practicality, local landowners were preferred as
sureties, but in some cases an entire township was made responsible for the
appearance of the accused. Id.
7 1 J. STEPiEN, supra note 3, at 233.
8 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 6, at 584.
9 D. FREED & P. WAi., BAIL N THE UNITED STATEs: 1964, at 1 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as FREED & WALD].
103 Edw. 1, c. 15 (1275).
111 W. & M., 2d Sess., c. 2, § 1(2:10) (1968).
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modem England, the relationship of the accused and his surety con-
tinues to be personal, while the discretionary nature of the English
system of bail enables the local magistrate to deny bail in the proper
case.12 England has no professional bail bondsmen.
The development of the American system of bail 3 has not followed
a similar course. In all but seven states the right to bail is guaranteed
by the respective state constitutions.14 Except in capital cases, where
bail is discretionary, Congress provided an absolute right to bail in
the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 Emphasizing the right of the accused
to bail in non-capital cases generated practical difficulties in the
United States when compared with England. Because of the size of
the United States and the difficulty incurred in locating someone in
an immense frontier land, there was a greater likelihood that the
accused would abscond once he was released into the hands of his
personal surety. In England, strong measures' 6 such as outlawry and
confiscation operated as effective deterrents to flight, and the private
surety was reasonably safe in the assumption that his charge would
appear to stand trial. In contradistinction, the private surety in
America was responsible for an accused unrestrained by such deter-
rents or similar lack of mobility. Consequently, the "promise to pro-
duce the accused gradually became a promise merely to pay money
should the accused fail to appear."' 7 These circumstances led to the
rise of the private commercial surety, who, in return for a fee, would
post the accused's bail bond thereby allowing his release prior to
trial.18 The practical result was that "money security came to take
12 FnE~n & WAiD, supra note 9, at 2.
13 Bail was first officially recognized in this country in 1641 by the Massa-
chusetts Body of Liberties. This recognition probably furnished the groundwork
for the provision of the eighth amendment that "excessive bail should not be
required .... . THE ATroRNEY GENERAi s CoMWnUrxz_ ON PovErY AND mHE
ADMmNISRmATION OF CRniNAL JusncE, POVRTY AND THE ADmSTIATION OF
FEDERAL CnmNmi JusTicE 59 (1963).
14 FREE & WALD, supra note 9, at 2 n.8.
15 Ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91. Note, however, that the Constitution does not by
its terms provide for an absolute right to bail. The Constitution does provide, by
the eighth amendment, that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required ..... U.S.
CoNsT. amend. VIIL
16 England was a property oriented country where "[o]utlawry (banishment
from the country) and confiscation (the loss of land and status) were the con-
sequences of flight. R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM 93 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RANsoM].
17 Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 967 (1961).
18 RaNsom, supra note 16, at 94. See also FREED & WALD, supra note 9, at
3; Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, supra note 17, at 968. Com-
mercial or professional bail bonding is a peculiarity of the American system of
justice which is found in very few nations. Hearings on S. 2888, S. 2839, and S.
2840 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in the Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on the judiciary, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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the place of personal sponsorship."19 In order to protect against
forfeiture and the consequent loss of his financial investment, the
professional bondsman would require collateral or indemnity from
the defendant or someone acting in his behalf.20 In addition, the
professional bondsman was given the power to pursue and capture
his charge should he jump bail. This right of pursuit was recognized
by the Supreme Court as early as 1873:
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the
custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the
original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they may
seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that
cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be
done. They may exercise their rights in person or by agent. They
may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on the Sabbath;
and if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose.
The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. None is needed.
It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.
21
The bondsmen's diligent attention to their custodial responsibilities
are presumably insured by their desire to protect their investment.
As modem business entities, bonding agencies are either controlled
by large insurance companies or operated privately. In either situa-
tion, the Kentucky bondsmen are under the control of the State
Commissioner of Insurance.2 2 This practice of regulation by insurance
commissioners is prevalent in several states.
23
Insurance companies assume the role of "bondsman" in order to
supply the individual agent with the necessary financial stability
required for his local bail bond operation. Under such an arrange-
ment, the premium charge by the agent is divided among the bonds-
man (i.e., the local agent), the insurance company, and a risk pool
or "build-up" fund. The purpose of the risk pool is to absorb losses
from forfeitures, thus minimizing the probability that the insurance
company will suffer a loss. The bondsman, on the other hand, protects
his interest by requiring varying amounts of collateral,24 and refusing
to underwrite bonds for any person thought by the agent to be a
19 RAqWsom, supra note 16, at 94.
20 Fr= & WALD, supra note 9, at 3.
21 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1873).
2 2 Ky. RFv. STAT. §§ 304.34-020-304.34-130 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KRS]. The express statutory subsection granting regulatory authority over bail
bondsmen to the Commissioner of Insurance is KRS § 304.34-020. The above
legislation was adopted and became effective in 1970.
23 Fnx=n & WALD, supra note 9, at 25.
24 Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, supra note 17, at 969.
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"bad risk."25 The result is a highly profitable nationwide business
controlled by private persons and functioning simultaneously as a
part of the criminal justice system.
II. C=QmuaE oF THm BAmL BoND SYSTEm
A. Private Retrieval Powers
The power of bondsmen to pursue and retrieve the accused is
generally provided by statute. Kentucky provides express statutory
authority for bondsmen to arrest the accused in its Rules of Criminal
Procedure.26  At common law this power27 arose from the private
contractual relationship between the bondsmen, as surety on the bail
bond contract, and the accused. The fundamental question concern-
ing this authority is whether dependence upon a private retrieval
system of bail bondsmen serves legitimate state interests in guarantee-
ing the defendant's appearance. The right of bondsmen to pursue
their itinerant charge extends across state boundaries because the
right is a private one which "arises from the private undertaking
implied in the furnishing of the bond,"28 and not through governmental
process. 29 In addition, an illegal seizure of the accused provides no
objectionable basis to the state's jurisdiction in a subsequent criminal
trial.30
The bondsmen, therefore, have the contractual duty to present
the accused to the court for trial. This duty is the basic reason for
the rule which gives the bondsmen the right to pursue and arrest
their principal. They may do so in any state into which their
principal may have fled. However, bondsmen may only arrest the
25 Mr. George L. Will, Executive Director of the American Society of Pro-
fessional Bail Bondsmen, has characterized the "good risk' as the local family
man who "works from week to week." He categorized the "bad risk" as someone
"who is usually a single individual who may not be in the city for any length of
time, [and] who has no relatives or friends .. Hearings, supra note 18, at 88
(testimony given before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee Hearing in 1964).2 6 Ky. R. Cmi. P. 4.24.
2 7 See generally Note, Bail Bondsmen and the Fugitive Accused-The Need
for Formal Removal Proceedings, 78 YAiL L.J. 1098 (1964). The sco e of the
bondsman's power to arrest and remove fugitive criminals should be noted.
[T]he bondsman is largely immune from judicial control; his power over
the accused may exceed the power of the state .... Clothed with the
powers of a peace officer armed with a warrant, the bondsman may
seize the accused in a foreign jurisdiction without the slightest compliance
with extradition requirements in the foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 1100.28 Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931).2 9 See Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35 (D. Pa. 1971); Thomas v.
Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
3o Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
1973]
cENTucKY LAw JouimAL[V6
accused for the purpose of surrender to the court and the exoneration
of their bond. This conclusion was reached by the Federal District
Court of Nebraska in McCaleb v. Peerless Insurance Co.31 The
plaintiff, an individual who had fled the jurisdiction after his release
on bail, brought the action against a local bondsman. At issue were
the rights and powers of a bondsman in pursuing an individual who
had "jumped bail" and gone into another state. In Peerless the court
found that:
[T]he plaintiff was arrested, not for the purpose of surrender-
ing him to the proper authorities, but for the purpose of the
financial protection of the defendant against possible loss of the
bond.82
The court reasoned that if the bonding agent captured the accused,
but failed to present him to the court, the rule granting the bondsman
his broad authority to arrest would be "effectively thwarted." Based
on this rationale the court upheld the plaintiffs claim:
It is the finding of this court that whenever a bondsman takes
undue advantage of his justly granted and needed authority in
violation of his duty to the granting court and such undue ad-
vantage results in injury or damage to his principal or another
party, that bondsman should and will be rendered liable for any
damage caused as a result of an act or acts which would render
liable any other person who was not vested with such authority.33
Similar criticisms of the bondsman's right to arrest an accused
are found in Shine v. State.34 This Alabama case involved a second
degree murder charge against an accused, who was originally con-
victed for carrying a concealed weapon, and who subsequently shot
331250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1955). The facts in this case were amazing
to this writer, and are worth summarizing to exemplify the recapture tactics of a
commercial bondsman. The plaintiff in the action was taken into custody by the
Omaha Police Department for a traffic violation. Bond was set in the amount
of $200, and was written by an agent of Peerless Insurance. The plaintiff then
left Nebraska, and went to California. He failed to appear in court in Nebraska.
The agent, fearful of forfeiture, proceeded to California and had the plaintiff
arrested. The agent then took control of the plaintiff's car, and for approximately
80 hours traveled throughout California looking for someone to secure the pay-
ment of plaintiff's bond and the expenses of the agent. The plaintiff was shackled
around his waist and wrists at all times that he was not actually in jail. The
agent then started back for Nebraska, driving the plaintiff's car. After arriving in
Omaha, the agent took plaintiff to an attorney where the agent and the plaintiff
executed a bill of sale for the car, and a release of all claims. At this point,
plaintiff was released and told by the agent to leave the state of Nebraska. This
was approximately one hour before the defendant was due to appear in court.
The agent made no effort to surrender his principal to the court.E321d. at 515.
33 Id.
34204 So.2d 817 (Ala. 1967).
[Vol. 61
19731 CowMsmarts
and killed one of several bondsmen3 5 as they were attempting to
break into the defendant's home in the early morning hours to arrest
him. The Alabama Court of Appeals was highly critical of the
"vigilante" technique employed:
The Code cannot and must not be construed to license company
officials to run around the countryside armed with lethal weapons,
to wit, shotguns and pistols, in an effort to collect on their personal
debts. The laws of this state will not permit the arrest of individ-
uals for the simple reason that they happen to owe a debt. The
proper procedure for enforcing collection of a debt is not by means
of an armed posse descending upon the debtor at 5:00 A.M. in
his own domicile.3 6
In United States v. Trunko,3 7 the government prosecuted a bail
bondsman for willfully depriving, under color of law, an inhabitant
of Arkansas of rights which were protected by the laws of the United
States, or alternatively, the Constitution. Although the defendant
bondsman was acquitted because of the failure of the government
to prove willfullness, the court did acknowledge that the bondsman
had acted illegally under color of law in violation of his principal's
rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
the court's estimate the bondsman's conduct38 was "highhanded, un-
35 Id. The bonding company had posted an appeal bond, in the amount of
$200, after the defendent was convicted for carrying a concealed weapon. In
this type case the bonding company would write an appeal bond for a person
unable to pay a fine and the defendant would deposit the amount of the fine
with the company prior to the time when the case was set for trial in the Circuit
Court. The bonding company would then pay the lower court fine and the appeal
would be dropped. If the defendant did not pay, the company would attempt
to rearrest him in order to collect on its private debt.
36 Id. at 826. In continuing its criticism of the tactics of the professional
bondsmen the court summarized its impressions on the subject:
This "pay or get shot" attitude has too long been allowed to flourish
with bonding cornjpanies. The controls over the bondsmen should hence-
forth be tightened to exclude the use of weapons when not justified, to
provide for investigation into every instance where it is claimed that
weapons are needed, and the mandatory accompaniment by a law en-
forcement officer on such occasions. Id.
37 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
38 The events which took place can most aptly be described in the words
of the court:
Trunko elected to make his arrest in the hours of darkness. When the
door was opened to his knock, he burst his way into the presence of a
law-abiding peaceable old man. He rudely entered a bedroom occupied
by a man, his wife, and a baby, flashing a light in the eyes of the sleeping
object of his search. He purported to be an officer of the law and
placed Williams under arrest, thereafter hastening him from the house,
placing him in an automobile, and handcuffing him as though he were a
angerous criminal. After so doing, the defendant ... drove away with
Williams at a terrific rate of speed, ignoring the pleas and protests of
[his] prisoner's wife. All of this was done to secure remission of a $500
misdemeanor bond. Id. at 565.
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reasonable, and oppressive"; represented an "affront" to the local
authorities and the state; and was "of a nature tending to bring law
enforcement into disrepute."39
The initial conclusion to be drawn from the few cases which con-
sider the private police operations of commercial bondsmen is that
these practices must either be subjected to a more comprehensive
regulatory scheme,40 or be eliminated from the criminal justice system.
A second conclusion is that the interest of bondsmen is predominantly
financial. Further, "if that interest can be served by means other than
retrieving and surrendering the fugitive defendant, then the bonds-
man usually makes no effort to satisfy the state's interest in the
defendant's appearance for trial."41 Given the financial motivation of
the commercial surety and the lack of effective regulation of the
bondsmen's private retrieval powers, the legitimate needs of society
would be more effectively promoted by total elimination of this
system of private bounty hunters, even though such elimination might
result in increased costs to the public.
B. Corruption-Criminal Infiltration
The history of the bail bond business is . . . replete with
examples of misconduct involving "insiders." Collusion with the
various officials who are involved with the administration of
criminal law has been uncovered in numerous investigations of
the bail bond business. Lawyers, judges, court officials, and police
have at some time succumbed to the enticements offered by un-
scrupulous bondsmen.42
It is not uncommon to find collusion between lawyers and bonds-
men.43 Each will refer cases to the other; each wil pay kickbacks
39 Id.
40 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has recently ruled that the business of
the professional bail bondsman has a sufficient impact on the welfare of the public
to be subject to regulation by the exercise of the state's police power on a local
basis. Johnson v. City of Paducah, 461 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1970). Accord, Resolute
Ins. Co. v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court, 336 F. Supp. 497 (D. Okla. 1971)
(holding that since the public interest requires a close regulation of the bail
bond business, the Oklahoma Bail Bond Act was not unconstitutionally discrim-
inatory because it imposed a more severe penalty on bail bond surety companies
than other surety bond companies). Notwithstanding these decisions, in reality
there is no system of accountability for the conduct of the bondsman during the
course of the arrest and detention of one who has jumped bail.
41 Murphey, Revision of State Bail Laws, 32 OMo ST. L.J. 451, 455 (1971).
See McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965).4 2 BANsoM, supra note 16, at 109.
43 The bondsman and attorney are often partners, combining office space,
and splitting fees. Note, Bail Bondsmen: An Alternative, 6 Suror.x U.L. REv.
937, 944 (1972). In addition, a frequent occurrence is a "package deal,' in which
one fee is provided for the services of bondsman and lawyer. NAToNAL CoN-
FERENCE ON BArn AND CannAL JusnTcE, Pnoc aNcs 119 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as 1964 NATIONAL BAI. CoNEERECE].
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to the other. An example of this practice emerged in the findings of
a Paducah, Kentucky Bail Bond Investigation Committee composed
of lawyers and laymen." The committee found that investigations by
the Kentucky State Police indicated that Paducah City Court officials,
local attorneys, and local bail bondsmen, had conspired in cases in-
volving citations for "driving while intoxicated" to prevent forfeiture
of the individual's license in return for the payment of a fee. The
committee found forty-seven instances of discrepancies between local
records and license records in the Department of Public Safety in
Frankfort, Kentucky.45 The committee also discovered that local
bondsmen had secured continuances46 in order to avoid the forfeiture
of bail bonds, failed to pay forfeitures within five days after entry of
judgments as provided by statute, and referred clients to certain
attorneys.
47
A recent Massachusetts case, In re Desaulnier,48 involved disbar-
ment proceedings resulting from an investigation of a local superior
court judge. Ultimately, the court found that the judge and a pro-
fessional bondsman conspired to influence the disposition of certain
criminal cases for a financial consideration to be paid either directly
or indirectly. The court was outraged at this judge's role with the
local bondsman:
[H]is [the judge's] admitted conduct, both in personal associations
and activity ... (particularly his conduct in borrowing money
from a bondsman whom it was his duty to supervise), has made
him unfit to continue either as a judge or as a member of the bar.
It need hardly be stated that he may not be a social intimate of
44 The Citizen's Committee, formed with the support of the McCracken
County Bar Association, investigated alleged violations of bonding regulations in
the Paducah City Court, and reported that bondsmen had violated bonding pro-
visions locally, and in other parts of the state. Paducah Sun-Democrat, May 31,
1972, at 1, col. 2. A local bondsman characterized the probe as a "conspiracy to
harrass" him which was being conducted with "political and personal motivations."
Paducah Sun-Democrat, June 7, 1972, at 2A, col. 8.45 Report of Paducah Bail Bonding Committee, August, 1972 (unpublished
report in office of the Paducah City Mayor). Fees paid for retention of defendants'
drivers licenses ranged from $300 to $900. Paducah Sun-Democrat, June 15,
1972, at 1, col. 6.
46 It seems a relatively common practice for judges throughout the country
to allow a bondsman additional time in which to apprehend a bail jumper in the
event the accused does not appear for trial or to allow the bondsman to defer
payment of a forfeiture indefinitely.4 7 IKRS § 304.34-090(1) (k) empowers the Commissioner of Insurance to
"deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew" any bail bondsman's license for failure
to satisfy a judgment against him within five days. KRS § 304.34-080(1)(g)
provides that no bondsman shall make referrals for attorneys. KRS § 304.34-080
(1)(e) makes it unlawful for a bondsman to pay a "fee or rebate or give any-
thing of value to an attorney in bail bond matters."
48 279 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1972).
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a bail bondsman whose conduct he is charged with regulating, or
that he may not borrow money from them any more than he
may from lawyers appearing before him.4 9
Bondsmen will generally repay favors granted by judges, court
clerks, and local police officials in four ways: (1) gifts of money;
(2) gifts of goods or services; (3) gifts of money directed to officials
by disinterested parties; and (4) refusal to write a bail bond if the
judge does not want the accused released.50
In addition to involvement in corrupt activities in the judicial
system, bondsmen often have connections with "organized crime,"
and use their power to give preferential treatment to syndicate mem-
bers, who may have the bondsmen on their payroll. 51 For example,
in an illegal gambling venture, the lower ranking members in the
criminal hierarchy do the required work on the streets (such as
making bets and gathering the policy slips). The result is exposure
to arrest; the bondsmen, however, by agreement with the employer,
arrange immediate bail for those who are arrested. 2 The relationship
between bail bondsmen and criminal elements has been summarized
as a "frequent and natural liaison that grew out of a flaw in our
legal system."
53
C. Lack of Judicial Control of Bondsmen's Activities
Of the myriad criticisms which may be leveled at bondsmen, the
most disturbing is the lack of governmental or judicial control of
bondsmen's activities and their role in the administration of criminal
justice. Over forty years ago the authors of the Wickersham Report
reached the conclusion that the role of bondsmen was far too
prominent in the criminal justice system.54
Initially, it should be reemphasized that the relationship between
the bondsman and the client is essentially a private contractual
49 Id. at 310.
50 Note, Bail Bondsmen: An Alternative, supra note 43, at 944.
51 Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, supra note 17, at 971-72.
Mr. George I. Will, Executive Director of the American Society of Professional
Bail Bondsmen, in a prepared statement before a U.S. Senate committee, explained
the bondsmen's connections with criminal elements: "It is charged that bondsmen
associate with thieves and crooks; it is unfortunate but true as we do not receive
our business from priests and bishops." Hearings, supra note 18, at 79.
5
2 RA~som, supra note 16, at 107. In many cases involving syndicate
members, the bondsman will have no knowledge of the individual to be bailed,
but will write the bail bond solely on the recommendation of other persons in the
syndicate. 1964 NATIONAL BAIL CONFERENCE, supra note 43, at 235.
53 RANsom, supra note 16, at 106.5 4 




arrangement of creditor and debtor.55 The bondsman demands com-
pliance with a contract which is naturally favorable to his interest.
This type of arrangement is legal, but patently inequitable and
oppressive.
Certainly the bondsman has a right to protect himself against
financial loss but the accused, who seeks the bond, is not dealing
at arm's length; rather he is at the mercy of the bondsman who
dictates the only terms upon which the contract will be written.
Nevertheless, when called upon to determine the validity of these
contracts, the courts have consistently upheld the bondsman's
right to exact such conditions.50
The consequence of refusal to submit to the contractual conditions
(e.g., inordinate collateral) and refusal to sign the bail bond contract
is confinement prior to trial. In several jurisdictions, including Ken-
tucky, bondsmen will be able to successfully charge excessive fees
because of their superior bargaining position. Thus, even if the
accused is willing to submit to the terms of the contract, freedom
prior to trial may impose financial hardships, especially in the case
of the indigent accused. 57 Second, bondsmen's decisions to require
collateral or to set the amount of collateral are not controlled by the
judicial system. The court is relegated to the relatively minor task
of setting the amount of bail, generally by reference to set fee sched-
ules. However, the court does not control the bondsmen's decisions,
or the defendant's stake in appearing for trial, even though incarcer-
ation prior to trial imposes, in addition to several other adverse
effects,58 the social stigma of "jailbird" on the accused.
Since pretrial release of the accused ultimately depends on the
bondsman's determination as to who is a good or a bad risk, it follows
that the alleged right to bail becomes meaningless without the co-
operation of the bondsmen. For what reasons will bondsmen refuse
to post bail?
First, the prejudices of the individual bondsman may dictate that
one otherwise eligible for pretrial release be imprisoned. For example,
55 See generally Note, Indemnification Contracts in the Law of Bail, 85 VA.
L. REv. 496 (1949). In Lexington, Kentucky, the local bonding company provides
a standard form contract which sets forth the conditions of the agreement between
the bondsman and the accused.5 6 Note, Bail Bondsmen: An Alternative, supra note 43, at 939.
57 The practice of setting excessive fees was one of the findings of the
Paducah Bail Bond Committee. Excessive fees are not prohibited by the Kentucky
Bail Bondsmen Act, but bondsmen are required to file premium rates charged
during the year with the office of the Commissioner of Insurance. KES § 304-34-
050M(). n
58 See text accompanying notes 65-69 infra.
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certain undesirables, such as civil rights demonstrators and non-
conformists generally, may discover that the local bondsman will not
underwrite their bail bonds.59 Second, pressure from members of a
particular community may force the bondsman to refrain from posting
a bond, in order to avoid strict enforcement of forfeitures or the
elimination of referrals, both of which could adversely affect the
bondsman's operation.60 Third, the bondsman may arbitrarily decide
that a racial or ethnic group is untrustworthy as a class, that members
of the class are all "bad risks," and that he will not write bail bonds
for this particular class. For example, one survey indicated that
bondsmen in Philadelphia will not post bonds for Puerto Ricans.61
Finally, the local bondsman's dislike of the defendant may result in
an unofficial black list, the result being that no bondsman will write
a bond for the defendant.
6 2
It is curious indeed that once bail has been set at a reasonable
amount the decision-making power of the court ends, and the power
of private persons whose decision is not only unregulated, but final,
begins. Admission to bail should not be based on the whims and
vagaries of commercial bondsmen whose operational strategy is
centered on financial gain rather than the interests of the individual
accused. Further, no statutory provision exists which imposes a duty
on the bondsmen to write bonds without regard to the nature of the
offense charged. The ultimate conclusion with respect to control of
bondsmen seems to be that not even the Supreme Court can require
the bondsmen to post bail for the accused. The bondsmen become a
"court" from which no appeal will lie.
The victims of the bail bonding system of non-accountability are
the individual defendants. The Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Illinois, 6
established the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
as governing a defendant's treatment in the criminal system. "There
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has."6 4 The conclusion follows that the
commitment to the ideal of equal justice is entirely incompatible with
the practice of making one's financial status the criteria of bailability.
59 See Note, Bail in the United States: A System in Need of Reform, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 380, 390-94 (1969).
60 Note, Bail Bondsmen: An Alternative, supra note 43, at 942.
61 FRED & WALD, supra note 9, at 33 & n.46.
6 2 Report of the Grand jury, 1954, Court of General Sessions, New York
County, quoted in 110 CoNG. REc. 10876 (1964).
633 51 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(denial of counsel to an indigent on appeal was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment).6 4 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956),
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What are the prejudicial effects which flow from pretrial detention?
Among other things, "the accused experiences separation from his
family, the possible loss of his job, and an impaired ability to assist
in his defense." 65 Lawrence Speiser, a director of the American Civil
Liberties Union, who testified before a United States Senate hearing
in 1966, concluded that "there are so many advantages in having a
client out of jail in preparing for trial that the disadvantages while he
is in jail are just overwhelming."66 An additional burden is placed on
the presumably innocent accused who is confined in the same manner
as individuals already convicted of a crime and serving their sen-
tence.67 Problems of rehabilitation may also arise:
Unnecessary jail detention . . . is also a factor accounting for
failure among those released on probation and even among those
who are eventually freed of their current charges. The typical
jail has little to inspire the prisoner and much to demoralize him.
The result is that he must spend his time .. . degenerating....
By the time [the prison] gets him he may be so embittered
. . . that it may take . . . several months . . . to get him in a
receptive mood for rehabilitation efforts.68
The prejudices which result from pretrial detention because of the
bondsman's dominant role 69 in controlling whether a person may be
granted release on bail are very real. It is patently absurd to place
the controlling authority70 to impose these hardships on an individual
65 Warren, Foreword to R. MoLLmJ, BAmI REFORm iN Tm NATboN's CArrAL
at iii (1966). Each year, many persons are imprisoned for varying periods because
they cannot afford the services of a bondsman. "Left behind in the wake of
detention were lost jobs, abandoned homes, families destitute and without support.
... Dead time in jail awaiting trial sometimes exceeded sentence after conviction
and often was ignored in computation of jail terms." Wald & Freed, The Bail
Reform Act of 1966: A Practitioners Primer, 52 A.B.A.J. 940, 940-41 (1966).
06 Hearings, supra note 18, at 138.
67 Senator Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina has noted that the accused
"can hardly be expected to remain impervious to being confined with convicted
criminals. This could have a particularly . . . damaging effect upon young
persons and might easily reinforce . . . any disposition they have for criminal
activity." Id. at 14.
68 Id. at 46 (statement of James V. Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons).
69 Acomparison can perhaps be made with the system of bail in Canada.
The Ouimet Committee, in a recent legislative study, unanimously recommended
that the use of professional bondsmen be prohibited, and that legislation be
enacted to ensure this result. C. Pow=_x, Awwsr AN BAm. f CANADA 67 (1972).
70 The remarks of David J. McCarthy, Director of the D.C. Bail Project,
are in point:
If we retain the... present system ... we are saying "Let's hope that
for heaven's sake a bondsman has the astuteness of mind to recognize
who is dangerous ... and who is not.... I say it is not the province
of the. . . Federal administration . . . to place such judgment . . . in
the hands of a private businessman. This is a judicial decision, it has
to be made by the Judge.... Hearings, supra note 18, at 153.
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in the hands of a professional bondsman operating an impersonal,
balance sheet business.
D. Control of Bondsmen in Kentucky
Under Kentucky law, the authority to regulate bail bondsmen is
vested in the state Commissioner of Insurance.71 The bondsmen are
required to obtain a license,72 file rates and financial statements an-
nually,73 and maintain daily registers and individual files on each
person bailed.74 The Commissioner of Insurance is empowered to
"deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew any license,"75 but may
impose, at his discretion, fines in lieu of suspension.
7 6
Several prohibitions placed on the activities of bondsmen are
designed to regulate the day to day operation of the business. These
include proscriptions against paying fees to public officials, 77 paying
fees or giving "anything of value" to attorneys,7 suggesting the
employment of any particular attorney,79 and contributing to certain
political campaigns.80
It is submitted, however, that these regulations, although adequate
on their face, do not reach the crux of the problem. The same may
be said of the situation in other jurisdictions, which seemingly points
to a dichotomy between paper rules and reality. The revelations of
recent investigations s ' exemplify the inadequacy of the present system,
71KRS § 304.34-020.
72 KRS § 304.34-030(1).
73 KRS § 304.84-050(1).
74KRS § 304.34-070.
75KRS § 304.34-090(1).
76 KRS § 304.34-180(1).
77 KRS § 304.34-080 ( 1)(a).
78KRS § 304.34-080(1)(b).
79 I(RS § 304.34-080(1)(g).
80KRS § 304.34-080(1)(f). More specifically, this provision applies to
contributions to the campaign of any elected official who can exert power or
influence upon the day to day conduct of the bail bond business."
81 The Paducah Bail Bonding Committee made the following findings with
respect to bail bonding practices in Paducah and the McCracken County area:
Professional bail bondsmen have:
(1) had free access to the Paducah Police Headquarters, the
Paducah City Police Court, and the Paducah and McCracken County
Jails for solicitation of business. A bail bonding company has used an
office adjacent to the Paducah City Jailers Office to conduct its private
business.
(2) solicited clients in the Paducah City Jail prior to the setting of
bail by the Paducah Judge and prior to the persons arrested being
permitted to make a phone call.
(3) charged excessive fees to persons arrested....
(5) hampered the effectiveness of the operation of the Paducah
Police Department. (Continued on net page)
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and indicate the need for approaching the problem from a different
perspective.
At present, Kentucky law provides a judge with only three
alternatives regarding bail in a criminal action: (1) freeing the
prisoner on his own recognizance; (2) release under a cash bond
set by the judge; and (3) execution of a bail bond with a bail bonding
firm for payment of a premium.82 These alternatives are insufficient
in a system which does not base justice on the defendant's financial
vorth.83
Recent pilot studies and bail projects, such as the Vera Foundation
Project in Manhatten and the D.C. Bail Project in Washington, D.C.,
have revealed that the need for the commercial surety can be obviated.
Both of these projects were based on the premise that courts will
grant release instead of setting bail if they are presented with credible
information concerning the defendant's reliability and community
ties. 4 Both projects proved highly successful. The Vera Foundation
reported that during its first thirty months of operation ninety-nine
percent of those released on personal recognizance appeared as
required, while ninety-seven percent of those released on bail posted
by bondsmen appeared.8 5 According to statistics released by the
D. C. Bail Project, three percent s6 of those released at the Project's
recommendation failed to make a court appearance. The results of
these pilot studies are excellent evidence that non-financial pretrial
release, based on community ties, is a viable alternative to the
traditional bail system.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(6) promised to help arrested persons in the outcome of their cases
or advised them they would receive harsh court treatment in order to
solicit business.
(9) referred clients to specific attorneys in violation of the Ken-
tucky Bail Bondsman Statute.
Report of Paducah Bail Bonding Committee, August, 1972 (unpublished report
in office of the Paducah City Mayor finding number 2).82 Ky. R. Cram. P. 3.06, 4.06.
83 "Since an individual is still presumed innocent until proven guilty, his
bail is not meant to penalize him in advance, yet that is exactly what our system
does, especially to poor defendants who find it is difficult or impossible to raise
the bondsman's fee.' Paducah Sun-Democrat, July 4, 1972, at 2A, col. 3 (remarks
by State Senator Carroll Hubbard to the Paducah Optimist Club on July 4, 1972).
8
4 R. MoLnmm, BAIL REFOrtM ix = NATIoN's CAPrrTAL 23 (1966). Report
of the Vera Foundation, Toward Justice for the Poor: The Manhatten Bai Project
3 (1964). Both projects employed substantially the same criteria in making
recommendations tor release to the local courts. These included employment,
family, residence, references, current charge, and previous record. Each defendant
was interviewed and scored on a point system based on his response to questions
incorporating the above factors.
85 Report of the Vera Foundation, supra note 84, at 5.
86 R. MoLLrmx, supra note 84, at 31.
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In addition to the increased use of release on recognizance
programs, several states and the federal government have enacted
ten percent bail deposit provisions, as an alternative to the traditional
system of bail.87 Under these plans, the defendant can obtain release
by depositing a down payment of ten percent of the total amount of
the bond with the court. In effect, the court becomes the bondsman.
A refund of ninety percent is given the defendant if he appears in
court at the appointed time."" Illinois was the first state to enact the
ten percent deposit rule. Recent statistical surveys show that in
Illinois more people take advantage of the ten percent deposit rule
than accept the services of bondsmen, and a higher ratio of defendants
are released prior to trial now than before the enactment of the ten
percent deposit provision. 9 This type of plan also shifts the risk of
loss to the accused. In addition, these surveys indicate that with
respect to defendants who do not appear, the bondsmen's record is
no better than the record under the ten percent deposit procedure. °
III. RECoMMENDATIONS
The results of surveys and the success of the bail reform projects
throughout the country mandate a positive answer to the question of
whether the bail system can operate without professional bail bonds-
men. In fact, it is difficult to ascertain any contribution of the
commercial surety to the criminal process other than obtaining the
freedom of the defendant for a non-refundable fee. Yet, this con-
tribution can be effectively discharged by release on an alternative
87 See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(4) (Supp.
1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 763.16 (Supp. 1972); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 780.66 (1968); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 969.02(2)(a), 969.03(1)(c) (1971). The above statutes authorize the
deposit with the court clerk of a sum not to exceed ten percent of the amount
of the bond.8 8 The ten percent which is deposited is admittedly the "going rate" for the
bondsman's fee in most states. However, in the case of the bondsman, the fee
is not refunded, even in part, although the bailed individual may comply with
all the terms set by the bondsman. The fact that this fee is not refundable leads
to the conclusion that a defendant loses his financial stake in appearing, and
renders questionable the bondsman's view that the payment of a fee to him
successfully deters the defendant from flight. It is conceded however that the
accused often does not abscond because of a fear of the bondsman. Bondsmen
strive to maintain an image of always successfully recapturing any defendant
who has "jumped bail. "89 Wice & Simon, Pretrial Release: A Survey of Alternative Practices, 34 FED.
PROB. 60, 63 (Dec. 1970). The bondsman's claim is that "his is a more effective
mechanism for allowing defendants to remain out of jail prior to trial." Id.
90 The bondsman has argued that, "because of his greater powers in judging
character as well as his monetary interests in the defendant's future behavior, the
defendants he selects will be less likely to jump bail or commit other crimes while
awaiting trial." Id. See also NAT. BUR. STDs., COMPmrATION AND USE Or CrmmNAL
COURT DATA IN RELATION TO PnE-TnIAL RELEASE or DEFrNxoANrs: PILOT STUDY
(Tech. Note 535, 1970).
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basis similar to the Illinois or federal models of pretrial release
systems. The federal model provides four basic kinds of release as
alternatives to reliance upon the commercial surety: (1) recognizance;
(2) execution of an unsecured appearance bond; (3) placing the
defendant into the custody of a designated person or organization;
and (4) execution of a bond in a specified amount, and the deposit
of up to ten percent of the bond with the court.91
A comparison between the federal and the Kentucky approaches
should be made. Under the Kentucky approach, the state attempts
to regulate and control the commercial surety within the context of
the traditional bail system. This approach is not feasible. A more
realistic approach lies in reforming the traditional system and in
eradicating many possibilities for abuse by eliminating the need for
bondsmen.
As noted above, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 provided four
basic alternatives to the use of the commercial surety. Under the
typical statute of this type, the court is required to release the accused
on his own recognizance, or on an unsecured appearance bond unless
one of two conditions exist: (1) the court determines that release
will not assure appearance, or (2) the accused is dangerous to the
community.92 If the court determines that either of these conditions
exists, the accused is still admitted to bail by one of several alter-
natives, including placing him in the custody of another and using
the ten percent deposit rule. The court can also restrict travel or
association, and has the further discretionary authority to impose
any reasonable condition "necessary to assure appearances as re-
qired... ."93 The statutes generally allow release based on a show-
ing of community ties sufficient to insure that the accused will not
flee if released.
The alternatives cited are preferable to a system which must
resort to a business which is obsolete and offensive to current values.
A statute based on these provisions should be adopted by the General
Assembly of the Kentucky Legislature in 1974. If such legislation is
enacted, the services of the commercial surety would be necessary
in very few, if any, situations.
91 U.S.C. § 8146(a) (1970). It was the recommendation of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement that: "Bail projects .. . be undertaken at
. ..local levels . . .to permit the pretrail release without financial condition"
of all possible defendants, and that each state "enact comprehensive bail reform
legislation after the pattern set by the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966."
PRESMENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFoRcEmENT AND ADmMInsATION or
JUsTncE, Tis= CHALLENGE OF CME IN A FEE SocmTry 132 (1967).
92 See ALAsKA STAT. § 12.030.020(a) (Supp. 1970).
93 See IowA CODE ANN. § 763-16(l)(e) (Supp. 1972).
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" - IV. CONCLUSION
The 1970 Kentucky Bail Bondsmen Act was based on the premise
that professional bail bondsmen were a necessary element to the
Kentucky system of pretrial release. However, any system which
retains the bondsmen's services as the linchpin of its pretrial program
faces a high potential for abuse and corruption. Bondsmen are an
anachronism in the criminal process who serve no useful function.
Their raison d'etre is profit, not the interest of the accused. More-
over, under the present system in Kentucky, the bondsmen, not the
courts, are the decision makers. It is time that Kentucky follow the
lead of other states and the federal government, and give the control
of pretrial release back to the courts, and the judicial system.
Frank Stainback
